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JURISDICTION AND PROCEEDING BELOW 
This court has jurisdiction pursuant to § 78-2a-3(2)(j), Utah 
Code Ann., and the Utah Supreme Court's order of referral dated 
July 7, 1988. 
This is an appeal from the trial court's summary judgment in 
the defendant and intervenors/counterplaintiffs' favor. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
On Appeal. 
I. Is a provision purporting to give the attorney "complete 





II. When a provision restricting the clients' right to settle 
is held to be unenforceable, should an attorneyf as a result, be 
entitled to a higher fee than he would have received had he not 
included the offensive provision? 
III. Should an attorney be permitted to increase his 
attorney's fee by unreasonably refusing to consent to his client's 
good faith settlement of the client's case? 
IV. Resolving all ambiguities against the plaintiff as 
drafter
 f does the language of the fee agreement taken as a whole 
restrict the Homeowners' right to accept a reasonable settlement 
offer or is the restricting language limited to only those 
situations where the Homeowners refuse to accept an offer plaintiff 
wished to accept? 
V. Resolving all ambiguities against the plaintiff as 
drafter, does the language of the fee agreement taken as a whole 
provide that in the event the Homeowners settled without the 
plaintiff's consent, the plaintiff's attorney's fee would, in the 
alternative, be determined based on an hourly rate for the work 
done. 
VI. Is the Homeowners' representation that one of their 
claims was "very substantial" a representation of fact that will 
support plaintiff's claim that he was fraudulently induced into 
entering into the contingent fee agreement, and if so, is plaintiff 
precluded from making the claim by the 6 year lapse between the 
time he claims to have discovered the alleged misrepresentation and 
the time he first made his allegations known? 
-2-
On Cross-appeal. 
VII. Does plaintiff's unreasonable refusal to accept payment 
of the contingent fee when the Homeowners settled their case, 
preclude plaintiff from recovering prejudgment interest on the 
contingent fee? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case. 
Plaintiff Robert J. DeBry brought an action against Graystone 
Pines Homeowners Association (hereinafter "Homeowners") and others 
seeking recovery of an attorney's fee of $31,200, plus interest and 
costs in connection with representation of the Homeowners in a 
prior action. The plaintiff claims he is entitled to a higher fee 
than that provided in the contingent fee agreement because of the 
Homeowners' alleged breach of a provision in the fee agreement 
prohibiting the Homeowners from settling without plaintiff's 
consent. The Homeowners contended that plaintiff's attorney's fee 
was limited to the contingent fee specified in the fee agreement, 
which fee is $18f300. 
Disposition below. 
The Homeowners moved for partial summary judgment limiting the 
plaintiff's attorney's fee to a maximum of $18f300. The trial 
court granted the Homeowners' motion but also ordered that interest 
would accrue on the fee at the rate of 6% per annum. The parties 
subsequently stipulated that the partial summary judgment be made 
final judgment fixing plaintiff's attorney's fee at $18,300, 
without prejudice to the right to appeal. 
-3-
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Provisions restricting the right 
to settle are unenforceable. 
As a matter of longstanding public policy, provisions in 
attorneys' fee agreements purporting to limit the client's right to 
settle or requiring that the attorney's consent be obtained first 
have uniformly been held to be unenforceable. The courts, on 
various theories, hold with remarkable uniformity that an attorney 
will not be permitted to recover an attorney's fee in excess of the 
contingent fee percentage as a result of a restriction on 
settlement having been declared to be unenforceable. The courts so 
hold to discourage the use of the repugnant provisions. In 
furtherance of the policy of discouraging the use of such 
restrictions, some courts have gone so far as to ^imit the 
attorney's recovery to the reasonable value of his services under 
quantum meruit, where calculation of the fee on that basis will 
yield a fee lower than the contingent percentage. The courts have 
not used quantum meruit as a basis for awarding an attorney's fee 
in excess of the contingent fee as plaintiff proposes in this case. 
Plaintiff's unreasonable refusal to approve 
the settlement precludes him from claiming more money. 
In addition, plaintiff's fee in this case should not be 
permitted to exceed the contingent percentage of the Homeowners' 
settlement because his refusal to approve the settlement was 
totally unjustified under the circumstances. The settlement was 
within the expected range and, indeed, was indisputably a very good 
settlement. Moreover, because plaintiff would have to pay a 
-4-
substitute attorney to try the case while plaintiff vacationed, the 
Homeowners' settlement yielded a higher fee than plaintiff could 
have received if the Homeowners won every point at trial. 
Homeowners did not breach settlement agreement. 
Even if the restriction on settlement were otherwise 
enforceable, the restriction was limited to those circumstances 
where the Homeowners unreasonably refused to settle, thereby 
unnecessarily forcing plaintiff to try the case. As such, the 
restriction did not apply in the instant case, and there was no 
"breach" because the Homeowners settled to avoid trial. 
The fee agreement does not provide in the 
alternative for a fee at an hourly rate. 
No reasonable person could interpret the fee agreement to 
provide, in the alternative, that if the Homeowners settled without 
plaintiff's consent, his attorneys' fee would be calculated at an 
hourly rate. The language relied upon as the basis for the 
supposed "alternative fee" merely stated that if the Homeowners did 
not wish to accept the contingent fee proposed, the plaintiff would 
continue to work on an hourly rate. Plaintiff himself never 
asserted the language of the fee agreement provided in the 
alternative for a fee at hourly rates until first three years after 
the fee dispute arose. 
There is no basis for any claim that plaintiff 
was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement. 
Plaintiff's claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter 
the contingent fee agreement and is therefore entitled to avoid its 
terms is without factual or legal basis. At no time during the six 
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years following his discovery of the alleged fraud, did plaintiff 
ever mention it to the Homeowners, nor did he allege any fraud in 
any of the complaints filed in this case. Plaintiff is therefore 
precluded by the statute of limitations and waiver from asserting 
any claims he might have had if there had been a fraudulent 
misrepresentation. In any event, the only fraudulent 
representation alleged to have been relied on by plaintiff before 
the contingent fee agreement was entered, namely, that the 
Homeowners' claim was "very substantial," is not a representation 
of fact that will support a claim of fraud. 
Plaintiff is not entitled to 
recover any interest. 
Because plaintiff's refusal to consent to the Homeowners' 
settlement and accept the contingent fee provided in the fee 
agreement was unjustified, he is not entitled to recover interest 
on the fee. The delay in payment is entirely of his own making. 
It would be particularly unjust to award interest in light of the 
delays, expense, and stress he has unnecessarily inflicted on the 
Homeowners in an effort to increase his fee. Moreover, recovery of 
interest in this case must be denied to deter attorneys from 
including restrictions on settlement in their fee agreements and 
then pursuing harassing litigation against their clients who settle 
in good faith. In addition, in the absence of a specific agreement 
providing for the accrual of interest on attorneys' fees, interest 
should not be allowed lest the matter of interest be used as a 
bargaining weapon by the lawyer in a fee dispute. 
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Sanctions should be imposed because 
this appeal is frivolous. 
There being no factual or legal basis for plaintiff's refusal 
to approve the settlement and accept the contingent fee, or for his 
claim that he was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement, 
the suit and this appeal should never have been filed. 
Accordingly, the Homeowners are entitled to recover their 
attorneys1 fees and double costs as the minimum sanction for 
plaintiff's filing of a frivolous appeal. These sanctions are 
authorized by Rule 33f Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and as 
part of the court's inherent power, in the interest of the 
administration of justice, to impose sanctions for attorney 
misconduct. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The following Statement of Facts is based on the undisputed 
facts in the record below. For the court's convenience copies of 
the most significant documents and affidavits in the record below 
are included in numerical order in the attached addendum. Those 
record references that are found in the appendix are shown in bold 
type. 
A. On November 9, 1978, Defendant Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association employed plaintiff to provide legal services on behalf 
of the individual home owners of the 36 units comprising Graystone 
Pines Condominiums. Under the initial employment agreement, 
plaintiff was to receive $50.00 per hour for work done in 
prosecuting the Homeowners' claims against Graystone Pines, Inc. 
and the corporation's principals, Busch, Coulam and Jensen 
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(collectively referred to as the "developers") for the developers' 
defective construction of the Homeowners1 condominiums. R. 1003, 
1017-1018. 
B. In a letter dated March 4, 1980f plaintiff proposed terms 
for a new contingent fee agreement to replace the hourly fee 
arrangement in response to the Homeowners1 concerns about the cost 
of the litigation which had been much greater than plaintiff had 
predicted. Plaintiff stated that he believed that a reasonable 
contingent fee under the circumstances to be 60% of any recovery. 
But since plaintiff estimated that the litigation was half way 
completed, he proposed that he be paid in full at his hourly rate 
for the work already performed/ and then be paid an additional 30% 
of any recovery obtained from the developers, thereby giving him 
the equivalent of a 60% contingent fee. R. 1005-1007, 1018. 
C. The contingent fee agreement also provided that under 
certain circumstances plaintiff would have "complete and unfettered 
control" over the settlement of the Homeowners' claims against the 
developers. Plaintiff said he required control over settlement 
because he felt that overly optimistic clients often turn down 
reasonable settlement offers since they may pursue the case without 
incurring any additional attorney's fees. R. 1006. 
D. The Homeowners accepted DeBry's contingent fee proposal on 
March 27, 1980. R* 1018. 
E. The first trial of the Homeowners' claims against the 
developers was begun in September 1980 and lasted for two weeks. 
At the close of evidence, all of the Homeowners' claims were 
dismissed. R. 1018f 1633. 
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F. Plaintiff appealed the dismissal of the Homeowners' 
claims. In July 1982f the Utah Supreme Court remanded all of the 
Homeowners' claims except the "black substance" claim for a second 
trial. Management Comm. of Graystone Pines Homeowners Ass'n v. 
Graystone Pines, Inc., 652 P.2d 896 (Utah 1982). The second trial 
was set for mid-July, 1983. R. 1018-1019, 1634. 
G. After the first trial the plaintiff asked the Homeowners 
to enter settlement negotiations directly with the developers, 
which they did. The Homeowners kept plaintiff advised of each step 
in the negotiation process. In March 1983 the Homeowners suggested 
to the developers that the prior litigation be settled for 
$98,470. In May 1983 the developers responded that they were 
willing to pay only $30,000 to settle the case. The Homeowners 
countered, with plaintiff's approval, with an offer to settle for 
$75,000. In early June 1983, about five weeks before the second 
trial, the developers responded by rejecting the $75,000 offer and 
offering to pay $47,000 to settle. The highest settlement offer 
the developers had made prior to completion of the first trial had 
been $45,000. R. 1019, 1314, 1634-1635. 
H. After further negotiations, in mid-June 1983, the 
developers agreed to settle the case by paying the Homeowners 
$61,000. Plaintiff was informed of these negotiations and refused 
to approve the Homeowners' settlement with the developers for 
$61,000 or to accept the contingent fee of $18,300 (30% of 61,000) 
as his fee. In late June 1983, he told the Homeowners that if they 
settled the case for $61,000 he would demand a fee of $31,300 based 
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on a rate of $50*00 per hour and his "reconstruction" of the number 
of hours worked. (Plaintiff had no time records to show the number 
of hours worked,) He told the Homeowners that he would not go 
along with the settlement because he felt he could get more if the 
case were tried. R. 679, 1011-1012, 1086-1087, 1635-1636. 
I. Prior to refusing to approve the $61r000 settlement, 
plaintiff had told the Homeowners that they had a 75% chance of 
recovering between $50,000 and $80,000 at the second trial. 
R. 1019, 1634. The total damage evidence introduced at the first 
trial with respect to the claims at issue in the second trial was 
$92,954.47. R. 307. 
J. Plaintiff was going on vacation during the time scheduled 
for the second trial, so he arranged to have a substitute attorney 
(Robert B. Hansen) appear for the Homeowners at the second trial. 
The substitute attorney was to receive up to 2/3 of plaintiff's 30% 
contingent fee (20% of any recovery) as compensation for trying the 
case. R. 1014, 1636-1637. 
K. The substitute attorney's portion of the contingent fee 
was to gradually increase as the trial date approached to reflect 
the work that he would have to perform in preparation for and trial 
of the case. As the Homeowners understood it, if settled before 
the first of July 1983, the other attorney would receive 5% of the 
recovery. If settled after that but before trial, he would receive 
10% of the recovery and if settled after trial began, he would 
receive a full 20% of any recovery. R. 1636-1637. 
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L. Under this arrangement, if all of the damage evidence 
introduced in the first time on the remanded issues was accepted at 
the second trial and the Homeowners were to prevail on all issues, 
plaintiff's share of the maximum possible recovery after trial 
would have been 10% of $92,954.47 or $9,295.45. R. 307. Plaintiff 
acknowledged this possibility in a letter to the Homeowners dated 
May 2, 1983 in which he said: 
The arrangement would cost you no more because I 
would pay Mr. Hansen [substitute counsel] out of my 
contingent fee. I would plan to pay him a fee of 20% 
(you pay me 30%). In fact this is a major financial 
sacrifice on my part as it would leave me with perhaps 
$10,000 for 3 years work. 
R. 1014. 
M. At the time he refused to approve the settlement, 
plaintiff knew that the Homeowners, older, retired people, were 
weary of the stress and strain of litigation. R. 1011, 1315, 
1637. He also knew that many of the Homeowners were on fixed 
incomes and were very concerned about the expenses of litigation. 
R. 1005, 1637f 1667-1668. 
N. At the time they settled the prior suit, the Homeowners 
were ready, willing and able to pay plaintiff 30% of the settlement 
as agreed and any additional costs that plaintiff could show were 
due, but plaintiff refused to accept payment. R. 1246-1247, 1636. 
0. The Homeowners concluded the settlement of their claims 
against the developers with plaintiff's knowledge and assistance, 
and plaintiff immediately filed suit against the Homeowners 
alleging the Homeowners had breached the fee agreement. R. 1011-
1012, 1086-1087, 1637. 
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P. Eight months after initiation of his action against the 
Homeowners, plaintiff moved to amend his complaint to add the 
developers as parties to his suit for attorneys1 fees alleging that 
the developers had collusively settled with the Homeowners to 
prevent plaintiff from receiving his attorney's fee. R. 261. The 
amendment was permitted/ but the developers were later dismissed on 
Summary Judgment from the case and no appeal from that ruling has 
been pursued. R. 446, 1277-1279. 
Q. Seventeen months after initiating the action against the 
Homeowners, plaintiff moved to add the developers' attorneys. Snow, 
Christensen & Martineau, in the prior litigation as a party to his 
suit for attorneys1 fees alleging that the developers and their 
attorneys had conspired to deprive plaintiff of his attorney's 
fee. R. 539, 546. Plaintiff also moved at that time to add one of 
the Homeowners, John Webster, as a defendant alleging that Webster 
had conspired to interfere with plaintiff's attorney's lien. 
R. 553, 562. The developers' attorney and Mr. Webster were all 
added as parties, but were later dismissed from the case on summary 
judgment and no appeal has been taken from that ruling has been 
pursued. R. 1272, 1277. 
R. Twenty-two months after initiating the suit, plaintiff 
moved to amend the complaint to add Commercial Security Bank as a 
party to his suit for attorneys' fees because the settlement 
proceeds had been deposited in Commercial Security Bank. R. 831, 
834, 844. The amendment was granted. R. 905, 971. 
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S. Twenty-three months after initiating the suit to recover 
attorneys' fees from the Homeowners, plaintiff moved to amend his 
complaint to add the Homeowners' attorneys as a party to his suit 
to recover attorneys' fees alleging that because some of the 
settlement proceeds had been used to pay the Homeowners' attorneys, 
the attorneys should be made a part to the litigation. R. 908. 
The motion was denied and no appeal has been pursued. R. 1036. 
T. Over 250 pleadings have been filed in this case, all but 
approximately 27 related to the fee dispute. The record is more 
than 1850 pages. Plaintiff has moved to amend his complaint six 
times. Three motions, alone, have been made by plaintiff attacking 
the court's order granting the Homeowners partial summary judgment 
from which this appeal ultimately resulted: Plaintiff's Motion 
Objecting to Form of Order and for Reconsideration (R. 1232); 
Plaintiff's Motion to Amend Judgment (R. 1391); and Plaintiff's 
Motion to Vacate Partial Summary Judgment (R. 1534). 
ARGUMENT 
This is not a garden variety fee dispute between the attorney 
and his client. This appeal raises issues that go to the core of 
the attorney/client relationship and the role of each in the 
prosecution and settlement of contingent fee cases. The rule 
adopted by the court in this case will serve to define the nature 
of the relationship between the attorney and client both in the 
negotiation of fee agreements and the settlement of cases. At 
stake is nothing less than the client's right to control his own 
case and the integrity of the fiduciary relationship between the 
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client and his attorney. It is helpful at the outset to consider 
the fundamental nature of the attorney/client relationship and some 
of the policies the law ought to advance when shaping rules 
affecting that relationship. 
The attorney/client relationship is highly fiduciary in 
nature. The client necessarily places the highest measure of 
personal trust and confidence in the attorney and the attorney in 
return owes the client absolute fidelity and matchless good 
faith. See 7 Am.Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 119 (1980). In most 
cases, particularly contingent fee cases, the client is unlearned 
in the law and has had little, if any, experience dealing with 
lawyers. Because of the lawyer's expertise and the trust and 
confidence the layman naturally places in his lawyer, the client is 
not generally inclined nor particularly well equipped to bargain 
with the lawyer regarding the terms of the fee agreement. As a 
practical matter, the client trusts, and ought to be able to trust, 
his lawyer to prepare a fair fee agreement that complies with the 
applicable ethical and legal standards. 
Contingent fee agreements by their nature are in conflict with 
the fiduciary relationship between the attorney and client, since 
they give the attorney a financial interest in the outcome of his 
client's case. Such fee agreements have nevertheless been 
permitted in most civil cases to permit those without adequate 
means to obtain legal representation. In spite of the differing 
interests and potential for conflict because of the differing 
interests of the attorney and client under contingent fee 
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agreements, they appear to work reasonably well, and for the most 
part both lawyers and clients seem satisfied with them. 
When conflicts do arise between the attorney and client under 
a contingent fee agreement, they must be resolved in light of the 
attorney's status as a trusted fiduciary and the fact that, 
notwithstanding the lawyer's interest in the outcome, the case 
belongs to the client, not the lawyer. Consequently, the rules for 
resolving conflicts should maximize the client's right to control 
his own case, encourage the client to place trust and confidence in 
his lawyer, promote the settlement of disputes and minimize the 
potential for disputes between the attorney and client. In 
addition, the rules adopted should not bring the legal profession 
into disrepute nor place the lawyer in a position where he may be 
unduly tempted to place his own interests before the interests of 
his client. 
I. 
The provision granting plaintiff "complete 
and unfettered control" over settlement 
negotiations is unenforceable. 
In the contingent fee agreement prepared by plaintiff, he 
purports to give himself "complete and unfettered control 
over . . . settlement" of the Homeowners1 case.1 R. 1006. 
xWhen a lawyer takes for himself "complete and unfettered 
control over . . . settlement," as plaintiff purported to do in 
this case, he attempts to strip the client of all control over his 
case. Were this permitted, the lawyer's interest in the case would 
rise to the point that he would have a proprietary interest in the 
case in violation of Rule 1.8(j), Utah Rules of Professional 
Conduct (formerly DR 5-103(A)). This is particularly so where, as 
here, the contingent fee arrangement is the equivalent of a 60% 
contingency. 
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It has long been universally recognized that such provisions 
purporting to preclude the client from settling his case without 
the consent of his attorney are against public policy, and 
therefore unenforceable. Maulding v. Louisville & N.R.R. Co., 168 
F.2d 880f 882 (7th Cir. 1948); Calvert v. Stonerf 33 Cal.2d 97, 199 
P.2d 297 (1948); 7 Am. Jur.2d Attorney at Law § 149 (1963). In 
accordance with this rule of law, the rules of professional 
responsibility require that the "lawyer . . ,. abide by [his] 
clientfs decisions concerning the objectives of representation" and 
"whether to accept an offer of settlement." Rule 1.2(a), Utah 
Rules of Professional Responsibility (1988). Though plaintiff does 
not appear to seriously dispute this rule (R. 1314), it bears some 
discussion to put the issues presented in their proper context. 
The client is the principal and owner of the claim and the 
attorney is his agent and fiduciary who prosecutes the claim under 
the client's direction. Their respective roles, responsibilities 
and rights should remain the same whether the attorney is paid by 
the hour or argues to a contingent fee. A contingent fee 
arrangement, however, introduces the potential for conflict because 
the attorney has an interest in the outcome of the case,, This 
conflict gives rise to the temptation, not present under hourly fee 
arrangements, for the attorney to attempt to control the case, 
particularly its settlement, to maximize his fee in relation to his 
labor, regardless of the wishes of or the effect on his client. An 
attorney yielding to this temptation may seek to control the 
litigation either directly, by an express prohibition on his 
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clientfs right to settle without his consent, or indirectly, by 
penalizing the client by imposing a higher fee in the event the 
client settles against his attorney's wishes. 
In those instances where the attorney has yielded to 
temptation, the courts have always refused to enforce the 
restriction on settlement to preserve the client's exclusive right 
to control his case. The rule is aptly stated in Giles v. Russell, 
222 Kan. 629, 567 P.2d 845, 850 (1977): 
It is generally recognized that . . . the client has 
exclusive control over the subject matter of litigation 
[citation omitted]. For this reason, the client may, in 
good faith, settle or compromise his litigation or claims 
with the opposing party at any stage of the suit without 
the knowledge or consent of the attorney, and such 
settlements are favored by the law where they are 
honestly made for the simple purpose of ending the 
litigation with no intention of taking advantage of the 
attorneys [citation omitted]. Neither a valid contingent 
fee contract nor an attorney's lien can interfere with a 
client's right to settle (citation omitted). An 
employment contract which prevents the client from 
settling without the consent of the attorney is void as 
against public policy [citation omitted], (emphasis 
added). 
The balance has thus been struck decidedly in the client's favor. 
The only limitation on the client's right to settle being that the 
client act in good faith for the simple purpose of ending the 
litigation.2 I_d. As a practical matter, the balance must be drawn 
so. 
The attorney and client are in very different positions when 
it comes to evaluating the settlement. In the usual contingent fee 
^The plaintiff has never contended that the Homeowners acted 
otherwise than in good faith nor, as discussed below, could he. 
-17-
case the lawyer's financial position and health (the client is 
often a personal injury victim) places him in a better position 
than the client to stand the risksf stress and delays of 
litigation. While the case is the client's one and only, it is 
only one of many cases the lawyer is handling. The lawyer is as a 
result in a much better position to play the odds and is more 
likely than the client to be willing to reject a settlement offer 
in the hope of a greater recovery. Whil*; the client is concerned 
about the total recovery, the lawyer is more concerned about the 
relationship between the amount of the contingent fee and the labor 
required to produce it. The lawyer's differing interests may 
consciously or unconsciously impair his objectivity. Requiring the 
attorney to accept the client's good faith decision is the only 
acceptable way to minimize the potential for conflict that is 
consistent with the nature of the attorney/client relationship and 
the client's absolute right to control his case.-3 
II. 
Plaintiff should not be permitted to profit 
by his attempt to unlawfully restrict the 
Homeowners' right to settle their own case. 
Plaintiff's arguments in support of his claim for money in 
addition to the contingent fee are characterized by the mechanical 
application of the black letter rules he would have applied. His 
arguments ignore the significant public policies that make the 
wooden application of these rules inappropriate. 
3The risk that the client may in good faith desire to settle 
on terms unsatisfactory to the lawyer is a risk the lawyer must 
take if he desires to accept a case on a contingent fee basis. 
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Blind adherence to legal rules is not a virtue and is totally 
at odds with the judicial function. Columbia Casualty Co. v. 
Hoohuli, 50 Haw. 212, 437 P.2d 99, 104 (1968). "Legal rules should 
result from, rather than be a substitute for legal analysis." 
Id. The mechanical application of rules generally applicable to 
contracts is inappropriate in the context of attorney's fees 
agreements. Fee agreements between attorneys and clients "as a 
matter of public policy are of special interests and concern to the 
courts. They are not always enforceable in the same manner as 
ordinary commercial contracts." Estate of Bradley, 128 Misc.2d 
240, 490 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. Sur. 1985). 
In view of the lawyer's fiduciary relationship with the client 
and his superior knowledge of the law and its workings, it is not 
surprising that the courts have held that where an attorney drafts 
a fee agreement containing an unlawful and unenforceable 
restriction on the client's right to settle, as here, the attorney 
will not be permitted to benefit by reason of the illegality of the 
restriction. The general rule is that: 
[Wjhere an attorney is employed on a contingent fee 
consisting of a percentage of the amount recovered, and 
the client compromises the case, the amount for which the 
case is settled is the basis on which the attorney's 
percentage is to be computed [citations omitted] . . . . 
40 A.L.R. 1529, 1530 (1926); see also 3 A.L.R. 472 (1919). In 
achieving the object of this general rule, that is preventing the 
attorney from benefiting from his illegal agreement, the courts 
have taken various approaches. 
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Some courts have held that when a client fails to adhere to a 
provision restricting the client's right to settle, the provision 
is so offensive that it cannot be said the client has breached the 
contract; therefore, the contract remains binding upon the parties 
according to its terms, with the exception* of course, of the 
offending provision. This is the position taken by the court in 
Lefkowitz v. Leblang, 187 N.Y.S. 520 fApp. Term. 19«2I|« In 
Lefkowitz an attorney was employed under a one-third contingent fee 
contract. When the client settled the case for an amount that 
would cause the attorney to lose money, the attorney claimed that 
the client's unauthorized settlement violated the fee agreement, 
thereby entitling the attorney to be paid the reasonable value of 
his services. The court rejected the attorney's claim noting that 
"it is well established ^that a settlement by the clieiot without 
the attorney's consent is not a breach of the agreement of retainer 
[citations omitted] and the plaintiff is therefore entitled only to 
a recovery of one-third of the amount of such settlement.'* Id. at 
521 (quoting In re Winkler, 154 A.D. 532, 139 N.Y*S. 755 J1913)). 
Other courts have severed the provision restricting the 
client's right to settle, declaring it void, and have then applied 
the remaining provisions of the contingent fee agreements Calvert 
v. Stoner, 33 Cal.2d 97, 199 P-2d 297 (1948); Newport Rolling Mill 
Co. v. Hall, 147 Ky. 598, 144 S.W. 760, at 763 (1912)). The 
rationale for this approach is that the void provision stould not 
taint the entire contract because the clause does not directly 
concern the mutual consideration offered by the parties. IcL In 
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other words, the express agreement not to settle without the 
attorney's consent is collateral to plaintiff's promise to work and 
the defendant's promise to surrender a portion of the recovery. 
Therefore the compensation features of the contract are 
enforceable/ though the restriction on settlement is not. The 
court in Newport applied this approach when considering a contract 
very similar to the fee arrangement in this case. After having 
determined that the provision limiting the right of settlement was 
void as against public policy, the court said: 
We are disposed to the view that this contract may be 
treated as a severable onef and that the objectionable 
clause may be stricken from it without affecting the 
validity of the remainder of the contract. The clause in 
question does not particularly concern the consideration 
specified in the contract; and it is generally in 
reference to contracts in which a part of the 
consideration is illegal that the courts have ruled that 
the entire contract was tainted. 144 S.W. at 763. 
However, where severing the offending provision and allowing 
recovery of the contingent percentage would permit the lawyer to 
recover more than he would have been entitled to receive on the 
basis of quantum meruit, the entire agreement had been declared 
void. For example, in Cummings v. Patterson, 59 Tenn. App. 536, 
442 S.W.2d 640 (1968), the court declared a contingent fee 
agreement containing a provision restricting settlement entirely 
void, rejecting the attorney's claim that the offending provision 
should be severed and the contingent percentage be allowed. The 
court limited the attorney's recovery to the reasonable value of 
the service rendered, which was $40,000, instead of permitting the 
attorney to recover the $100,000 contingent fee. 
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In rejecting the attorney's claim for the greater fee, the 
court noted that if the attorney were permitted to recover a 
greater fee, "parties will be at liberty to continue the use of 
this or similar provisions [restricting the client's right to 
settle] without any risk whatever, and they may be used to impede 
or prevent the settlement of disputes. A continuance of a practice 
which we condemn as against public policy will be permitted, if not 
invited. The maintenance of sound rules of public policy can only 
be effected through penalizing those who violate them." I^d. at 
642 (quoting Butler v. Young, 121 W.Va. 176, 2 S.E.2d 250' (1939). 
See also Mattionif Mattioni & Mattioni, Ltd. v. Ecological Shipping 
Corp., 530 F.Supp.. 910, 915 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (severance denied where 
the contingent fee presumably would have exceeded the fee 
calculated on the basis of quantum meruit since the attorneys 
sought a fee based on the contingent percentage and the client 
sought to have the fee "limited" to a recovery in quantum meruit); 
Davis v. Webber, 66 Ark. 190, 49 S.W. 822 (1899) (attorney seeking 
a contingent fee of $2,885.50 was allowed onr $1,000).4 
Thus, while the foregoing cases take differing approaches in 
differing circumstances, they all agree in a number of significant 
respects. First, any restriction on a client's right to settle is 
unenforceable, and second, a lawyer will not be permitted to gain 
anything by reason of having attempted to impose such a 
4The Cummings, Mattioni, and Davis cases discussed here 
comprise the authority primarily relied upon by plaintiff in 
support of his claim that he is entitled to recover more than the 
contingent fee on the basis of quantum meruit. 
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restriction. Finally they all make the client's right to settle 
paramount, encourage settlement, and discourage the use of 
provisions restricting settlement thereby minimizing conflicts and 
preventing clients from being overreached by their lawyers. 
III. 
Having acted unreasonably in refusing to approve 
the settlement, the plaintiff should not as a 
result be permitted to increase his fee. 
In his letter to the Homeowners less than two weeks before he 
filed suit against the Homeownersf plaintiff tells why he wants 
more money: 
In my letter of March 4, 1980, I reluctantly agreed 
to your proposal of a contingent fee.5 However, a clear 
condition of that agreement was that I would control the 
settlement negotiations. Since you have now breached 
that condition, it is my opinion that we must revert back 
to the hourly fee. 
I think that is especially appropriate in view of 
the reason for your settlement. In our last discussion, 
it was very clear that you were settling on the reduced 
basis because some or all of the parties did not wish to 
go through the stress of a trial. In fact, I heard the 
comment that someone would rather pay $1,000.00 out of 
his own pocket, than go through another trial. I am 
certainly sympathetic with those feelings. However, it 
is not appropriate to have my contingent fee reduced 
because the client does not want to go through with the 
trial. 
For the foregoing reasons, I am submitting my bill 
based upon an hourly basis. If you do not agree, you 
should contact an outside attorney to consult with you in 
this matter. 
R. 1011-1012, (footnote and emphasis added). 
5In evaluating plaintiff's characterization of his reluctance 
to agree to the contingent fee agreement, one must keep in mind 
that at the time he proposed the contingent fee agreement, 
plaintiff considered it the equivalent of a 60% contingent fee 
agreement. R. 1006. 
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In shortf the plaintiff claims that by settling the case for 
$61,000 rather than proceeding to trialf the Homeowners have 
unfairly reduced the plaintiff's fee. But, based upon the 
undisputed facts known to the plaintiff prior to the time he 
refused to consent to settlement, plaintiff knew, and indeed 
acknowledged, that if the case were tried the maximum fee he could 
recover would be at best substantially less than that he would 
receive if the case were settled. 
A. The Homeowners1 settlement for $61,000 was reasonable and 
in good faith. 
Given the risks inherent in any suit, the size of the 
settlement ($61,000) in relation to the potentially maximum 
recovery after a successful trial ($93,000) is alone enough to 
establish the reasonableness of the Homeowners1 settlement. But 
the specific circumstances of this case make the reasonableness of 
the Homeowners1 settlement beyond dispute. 
At the time of the settlement the Homeowners were a few weeks 
from a second trial on their claims against the developers. 
R. 1635. At the end of the first trial all of the Homeowners1 
claims had been dismissed, requiring an appeal with the attendant 
delay. R. 1018. Given the Homeowners' experience with the first 
trial they were understandably apprehensive. With the second trial 
fast approaching the developers had rejected the Homeowners' offer, 
made with plaintiff's approval, to settle for $75,000 and had 
counteroffered to settle for $47,000. The highest offer the 
developers had made before going ahead with the first trial was 
$45,000. R. 1635. In addition, plaintiff had told the Homeowners 
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that he estimated there was a 75% chance of recovering somewhere 
between $50,000 and $80,000 at trial. R. 1634. The Homeowners 
were also placed in the disconcerting position of having to use 
substitute counsel to try the case since plaintiff would be on 
vacation during the trial. R. 1014. No doubt, the loss of the 
services of one so familiar with the case and applicable law, 
plaintiff having tried and appealed from the first trial, was a 
concern of the Homeowners. R. 192. Furthermore, because the 
corporate entity that developed the condominiums was insolvent, the 
Homeowners would have had to succeed on their claim to pierce the 
corporate veil to reach the assets of the individual developers if 
any recovery was to be had. R. 307. The reasonableness and good 
faith of the Homeowners1 settlement is thus readily apparent. As 
it was, the settlement was in the plaintiff's best interest, 
notwithstanding his claims otherwise. 
B. Plaintiff's fee was not reduced as a result of the 
Homeowners' settlement of their case for $61,000. 
Plaintiff's net fee under the 
Homeowners' settlement - $15,250. 
Under the contingent fee agreement, plaintiff was to receive 
30% of any recovery, in addition to retaining all fees paid before 
the fee agreement was changed from an hourly to a contingent fee 
agreement. R. 1006. Thirty percent of the $61,000 settlement is 
$18,300.6 Plaintiff refused the Homeowners' offer to pay the 
Plaintiff's net fee under the settlement would apparently 
have been $15,250 because $3,050 of the fee was due the attorney 
who would actually try the case. 
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contingent fee and instead chose to sue for a "larger fee." 
Plaintiff's maximum fee if 
the case were tried - $9,295.45. 
The evidence introduced by plaintiff at the first trial on the 
Homeowners' claims remanded for a second trial showed a maximum 
possible damage claim on the remanded claims of $92,954.47. 
R. 307. Under the fee arrangement with the substitute attorney who 
would try the case, plaintiff weald receive 10% of any verdict as 
his share of the fee, while substitute counsel would receive 20% of 
any verdict as payment for the work required to try the case. 
Thereforef even if the Homeowners won on every issue at the second 
trial, the most that plaintiff could hope to receive as a fee would 
have been $9,295.45, 10% of $92,954.47. Plaintiff expressly 
recognized this in a letter to the Homeowners sometime prior to his 
refusal to approve the $61,000 settlement when he wrote: 
The arrangement [with substitute counsel] would cost 
you no more because I would pay [substitute counsel] out 
of my contingent fee. I would plan to pay him a fee of 
20% (you pay me 30%). In fact, this is a major financial 
sacrifice on my part as it would leave me with perhaps 
$10,000 for three years work. 
R. 1014. 
Thus, at the very time plaintiff was threatening the 
Homeowners with a claim for a higher fee than agreed if they 
refused to go to trial and settled the case, plaintiff knew that he 
would certainly receive a higher fee if the case were settled at 
that time than if he had to pay substitute counsel to try the case. 
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Plaintiff's maximum fee if the case were 
settled at the figure approved by him - $15,000,00. 
Plaintiff knew when he approved the offer to settle with the 
developers for $75,000, that $75,000 would become the ceiling above 
which the developers would not go to settle the case. Plaintiff 
acknowledges in an affidavit that it was his experience (in 
accordance with experience generally) that defendant's "settlement 
offers are virtually never revoked11 and that their settlement 
offers increase as trial approaches. R. 1664. Similarly, he must 
have known that plaintiff's offers are likewise virtually never 
revoked and that they go down as trial approaches. Such is the 
nature of the negotiation process. Given the history of settlement 
negotiations before the first trial and the course settlement 
negotiation invariably follow, the best that plaintiff could 
realistically have been expected, would have been a counteroffer 
and settlement at some amount less than $75,000. 
Plaintiff did not expect the developers1 highest settlement 
offer until the eve of the second trial, as had been the case 
before the first trial. R. 1664-1665. But in the unlikely event 
the offer he expected before trial was as high as the previously 
rejected $75,000, plaintiff's fee would only have been $15,000. If 
the case were settled for $75,000 after trial began plaintiff's fee 
would have been $7,500. The following table summarizes the 
division of the fee between plaintiff and substitute counsel, 
pursuant to their agreement, with settlement at $75,000 at various 
times before and after the trial began in mid-July: 
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Substitute 
Settlement Settlement Plaintiff's Counsel's 
Amount Date Fee Fee 
$75,000 June 1983 $18,750 $ 3,750 
75,000 July 1 - Mid-July 15,000 7,500 
75,000 Mid-July on 7,500 15,000 
Time was working against plaintiff. Holding out for a higher 
settlement offer as plaintiff claims was his desire (R. 1665-1666) 
would have reduced, not increased, his fee. It was sheer fancy to 
hope for a settlement offer in excess of the once rejected $75,000. 
C. Based on plaintiff's own evaluation of the risks involved, 
the settlement value of the case was less than $61,000. 
Prior to the second trial on the Homeowners' claims plaintiff 
estimated that there was a 75% chance of recovering between $50,000 
and $80,000 at trial and a 50% chance of recovering between $80,000 
and $100,000.7 R. 1634. Under plaintiff's evaluation, if the case 
were tried 100 times, in 75 of the trials the verdict would be in 
the range between $50,000 and $80,000. In the other 25 trials the 
verdict would be either above $80,000 or below $50,000. The 
maximum recovery at trial was limited to approximately $93,000 and 
the minimum, of course, to 0. R. 307. Presumably, the values of 
the highest and lowest ends of the possible recovery cancel each 
other. Based on plaintiff's estimate, the expected settlement 
value of the case would then be between $37,500 and $60,000.** 
'If punitive damages were allowed, he estimated that there was 
a 25% chance of a recovery in excess of $100,000. The trial court 
had dismissed the Homeowners' claim for punitive damages so this 
estimate was not relevant. R. 1634. 
8This range is arrived at by multiplying the chance of 
recovery (75%) times the possible range of recovery ($50,000 to 
$80,000) . 
- O Q -
The progress and results of the settlement negotiations show 
that the developers placed a similar evaluation on the Homeowners1 
case. R. 1635. 
The undisputed facts show that no one could conclude that 
plaintiff's contingent fee was reduced by the Homeowners' agreement 
to settle their case for $61,000. Indeed, one must conclude that 
it was to plaintiff's financial advantage to have the case settled 
at that figure, at that time. Surely then, plaintiff is not 
entitled to receive more money because the Homeowners settled the 
case without his consent, even if they did so in violation of a 
restriction on settlement as plaintiff contends.9 To permit such a 
result under any theory, even the most technical or "creative" the 
plaintiff can muster, would be unjust and contrary to the interests 
of not only the clients, but of lawyers as well, as it would bring 
the already beleaguered legal profession into disrepute. 
Since the plaintiff's fee was not reduced by the settlement, 
why this lawsuit? All things considered, one must, however 
reluctantly, conclude that the purpose of the suit was either to 
punish the Homeowners, for their alleged "breach" of the 
restriction on settlement or to extort a higher fee from the 
Homeowners, or both. 
yAs discussed below, because of plaintiff's purpose for 
including the restriction, the Homeowners' settlement was not in 
breach of the restriction. 
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D. Plaintiff's suit is an attempt to punish or take 
unconscionable advantage of the Homeowners. 
When the Homeowners settled the prior case over plaintiff's 
objection and notwithstanding his threats that he would insist on a 
higher fee, he sued immediately for a fee substantially more than 
half again as much as he was due under the contingent fee 
agreement. He knew at the time that he stood to gain nothing by 
seeing the prior case through to trial, and perhaps of even more 
significance, he knew the Homeowners were tired from the stress of 
nearly five years of litigation and were not in a position 
financially to litigate with him.10 R. 1005, 1011, 1637. Under 
these circumstances, the plaintiff's suit seems nothing less than 
an attempt to extort a higher attorney's fee through litigation, 
from a group of people who were sick and tired of the stress and 
expense of litigation, all apparently because plaintiff was 
unhappy, either because he lost the gamble he knowingly took when 
he agreed to represent the Homeowners on a contingent fee basis or 
because the Homeowners had not followed his direction as he felt 
was required by the terms of the fee agreement.11 
luPlaintiff was able to use attorneys on his own staff to 
litigate the fee dispute at a cost substantially less than the 
Homeowners would have to pay attorneys to represent them. In a 
battle of attrition like that waged by plaintiff he had the upper 
hand. 
iXPlaintiff recognized that the contingent fee agreement was a 
gamble in the March 4, 1980 contingent fee proposal when he wrote 
"before you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is a 
gamble." (R. 1005-1007) 
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Were there any doubts regarding plaintiff's motivation in 
bringing this suit, they are dispelled by the way the plaintiff has 
pursued the litigation of this claim. All that has ever been at 
dispute regarding plaintiff's fee has been $13,000, the difference 
between the amount of the contingent fee the Homeowners were 
willing to pay and additional fees the plaintiff demanded. Though 
only $13,000 has been at stake, plaintiff has litigated this case 
in a fashion which would not be warranted if ten times that amount 
were at risk. 
He has made every possible effort to expand the litigation to 
include parties with no real interest in the fee dispute. He first 
brought in the individual developers who were defendants in the 
prior suit on the theory that they had interfered with his 
attorneyfs lien on the settlement proceeds and conspired to deprive 
him of his fee. R. 261, 446. He then brought in Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, the attorneys for the developers in the prior 
litigation, on the same theories of interference and conspiracy 
(R. 546), followed by adding one of the Homeowners, John Webster, 
as a defendant on the conspiracy theory. R. 562. These defendants 
were all eventually dismissed from the case on Summary Judgment and 
no appeal has been pursued. R. 1272, 1277. He then brought in 
Commercial Security Bank since settlement proceeds had been placed 
in a segregated account at that bank pending resolution of the 
case. R. 841, 845, 929-933. And finally, he even attempted to 
join the Homeowners' present attorneys as defendants because their 
fees had been paid with some of the settlement proceeds in excess 
of the amount claimed by plaintiff. R. 908, 1036. 
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Plaintiff has filed numerous motions relating to the fee 
dispute, including three motions made in an attempt to reargue the 
court's order granting partial summary judgment to the Homeowners, 
the last a motion to vacate on the grounds that the Homeowners had 
fraudulently induced plaintiff to enter the contingent fee 
agreement, which, as described below, had neither legal nor factual 
basis. R. 1232, 1391, 1534. He has attempted to prevent the 
Homeowners from using the proceeds of the settlement, even those 
amounts in excess of that claimed in his complaint. R. 841. 
Plaintiff has even gone so far as to claim damage as a result of 
the loss of negotiating leverage he would have had he been able to 
control the settlement proceeds. R. 1169. 
As a result, the pleading files have ballooned, the attorneys' 
fees necessarily incurred by the Homeowners are more than a case 
this size would warrant, and the trial court had to spend an 
inordinate amount of its time on this case. Under these 
circumstances, plaintiff's fee should not be permitted to exceed 
the 30% contingent fee as agreed and, as discussed below, 
appropriate sanctions should be imposed against plaintiff to deter 
further such conduct. 
IV. 
The fee agreement is not subject to the 
interpretation suggested by plaintiff. 
A. The fee agreement must be interpreted objectively, with 
all ambiguities resolved against the plaintiff as a fiduciary and 
the drafter of the agreement. 
Plaintiff relies heavily on his interpretation of the language 
of the fee agreement. So though the resolution of this case turns 
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on larger principles of public policy which require that the matter 
be decided against the plaintiff regardless of the interpretation 
placed on the contract language, it is still appropriate to address 
the contract language itself. The language of the contract must be 
interpreted objectively, of course, without reference to the 
subjective intent of the parties, and any ambiguities in the 
agreement must be construed against the plaintiff since he drafted 
the agreement. Sears v. Riemersma, 655 P.2d 1105, 1107-1108 (Utah 
1982). It is especially appropriate in this case that the 
agreement be interpreted against the plaintiff since he was the 
Homeowners1 trusted fiduciary. 
Plaintiff construes the contingent fee agreement to prohibit 
the Homeowners from accepting a settlement without his consent, and 
as providing in the alternative for a higher alternative fee based 
on his hourly rate, rather than a fee based on the agreed 
contingent percentage, in the event of settlement without his 
consent. The language of the agreement, interpreted objectively, 
with all ambiguities resolved against plaintiff, cannot be so 
construed. The relevant contract language is as follows: 
. . . I [plaintiff] suspect that a reasonable contingent 
fee for this type of case would be 60% of any recovery. 
Of course, we are about one-half way through the 
litigation process. Thus, a reasonable contingent fee to 
press the case from this point on would be 30% of any 
recovery. If you wish, I would finish the case on that 
basis (i.e., 30% of any recovery). . . . However, before 
you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is a 
gamble. If we go through another 100-200 hours, and lose 
the case, you obviously win the gamble. However, we 
might just as well enter into some settlement next week 
in which you lose the gamble. 
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One further matter on contingent fees. Clients are 
sometimes overly optimistic because they are not paying 
anything to their attorney. Thus they may turn down 
reasonable settlement offers because it costs them 
nothing to gamble on the results of a trial. Therefore, 
I would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete 
and unfettered control over any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposed is for any reason 
unworkable, I would continue to work on an hourly basis. 
R. 1006 (emphasis original). 
B. The Homeowners' settlement of the case to avoid trial was 
not a breach of the fee agreement. 
The plaintiff's reason for reserving control over settlement 
and the relationship between that reason and the reservation are 
very explicitly stated. The reason being to protect the plaintiff 
from "overly optimistic" clients who "turn down reasonable 
settlement offers because it costs them nothing to gamble on the 
results of the trial," and "[t]herefore" plaintiff required 
"complete and unfettered control over any settlement." R. 1006. 
The reasons for the restriction on settlement and the restriction 
itself are so firmly bound together by the language, the latter 
following directly from the former, that one must conclude the 
restriction to be limited to those situations where it serves the 
purposes expressed. Any claim that the reasons for the restriction 
are given were merely by way of example is not borne out by the 
language. And even if one could find ambiguity because of the 
perceived differences in scope between the reasons given and the 
restriction imposed when considered separately, rather than in 
reference to each other as they should be, the ambiguity must be 
resolved against the plaintiff as drafter and fiduciary. 
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Accordingly, the language must be interpreted to limit the 
restriction on the homeowners1 right to settle to those instances 
where a settlement offer which plaintiff thought reasonable was 
rejected by the Homeowners/ with the result that plaintiff would 
have to proceed with trial. If more was intended by plaintiff/ he 
should have so stated. So construed there has been no breach of 
the restriction on settlement/ since the Homeowners accepted a 
settlement offer and thereby avoid expense of trial. 
C. The fee agreement cannot be interpreted as providing in 
the alternative for attorney fees at an hourly rate. 
The language of the fee agreement 
does not provide for an alternative fee. 
Plaintiff interprets the fee agreement as providing that in 
the event the Homeowners' breached the agreement by settling 
without plaintiff's consent/ his fee is to be determined based on 
an hourly rate. Plaintiff's interpretation relies on the one 
sentence taken out of context reading as follows: "If the 
contingent fee proposed is for any reason unworkable/ I would 
continue to work on an hourly basis." R. 1006. Read in context/ 
this sentence obviously means no more than that if the Homeowners 
did not agree to accept the contingent fee agreement "proposed/" 
plaintiff would "continue" to work at his hourly rate as provided 
in the then existing fee agreement. It is unreasonable to read 
more into this language. Again# if there is any ambiguity in the 
language used/ it must be resolved against the plaintiff. 
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When drafted, plaintiff never considered the 
agreement as providing for an alternative fee. 
Moreover, plaintiff's claim that he intended that the language 
of the fee agreement provide for an alternative fee calculated on 
an hourly basis is belied by his conduct following settlement. 
Plaintiff's correspondence with the Homeowners at the time the fee 
dispute arose negates any intention of relying any language in the 
fee agreement as a basis for his claim that as a result of the 
settlement his fee should be calculated at an hourly rate. 
Plaintiff's first letter to the Homeowners regarding the fee 
dispute does not assert that the language of the agreement provided 
for an alternative fee agreement, though it specifically refers to 
other language in the fee agreement. R. 1009-1010. In his next 
letter to the Homeowners, plaintiff refers to the language of the 
settlement agreement restricting the Homeowners' right to settle, 
but states merely that it is his "opinion that we must revert back 
to the hourly fee." R. 1011-1012 (emphasis added). Plaintiff's 
failure to rely on the language of the fee agreement to support his 
"opinion" is telling indeed. Had plaintiff believed at that time 
that the fee agreement provided in the alternative for a fee 
computed at an hourly rate, being the experienced lawyer he is, one 
would certainly have expected him to have said so in this letter. 
Similarly, there is no reliance on the language of the fee 
agreement or mention of an alternative fee agreement in plaintiff's 
early answers to interrogatories. In his answers to 
interrogatories plaintiff claims that it was the Homeowners' 
assumption of control of settlement in breach of the "condition" 
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that plaintiff be given control over settlement that, "as a matter 
of contract law," caused the "automatic" reversion to a fee based 
on the "original" hourly basis. R. 135-136. In addition, 
plaintiff's complaint and amended complaints have never alleged an 
alternative fee agreement as the basis for his claim for more 
money. 
Plaintiff first asserted that the language of the fee 
agreement provided for calculation of his fee on an alternative 
basis in his memorandum in opposition to the Homeowners1 motion for 
summary judgment on the fee issue filed three years after the fee 
dispute arose. R. 1321-1322. Significantly, plaintiff's assertion 
that the fee agreement provided an alternative basis for 
calculation of his fee appears to coincide with his discovery of 
the case of Ward v. Orsini, 243 N.Y. 123, 152 N.E. 696 (1926), 
cited in his opposing memorandum below and in his opening brief 
here in support of the proposition that alternative fee agreements 
are enforceable. R. 1326. The timing of the assertion supports 
further the inappropriateness of plaintiff's interpretation and 
confirms the disingenuousness of the interpretation he now 
advances. 
D. Alternative fee agreements are indirect restrictions on 
the client's right to settle and are therefore enforceable. 
But, even if the language of the fee agreement could be 
construed to provide in the alternative for a fee based on his 
hourly rate as plaintiff now claims, such an agreement would be 
void as against public policy, since it could be used as a penalty 
or a means to indirectly force compliance with an otherwise illegal 
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and unenforceable restriction on settlement. When an alternative 
fee agreement provides for a retrospective change to an hourly fee 
in the event the client breaches the unlawful restriction on 
settlement, it does not function to protect any legitimate interest 
of the lawyer. Rather it becomes a means of enforcing the unlawful 
restriction. Obviously the alternative fee will only be invoked 
when it will yield a higher fee than the contingent percentage. By 
threatening a higher fee on an hourly basis, the "alternative fee" 
becomes a weapon to force compliance with the unlawful restriction 
on settlement. Any claim that alternative fee agreements do not 
restrict the client's right to settle ignores reality. It is not a 
simple matter of the fee being calculated one way if the lawyer 
consents and another if he does not. The coercive effect is 
obvious. Were such agreement enforceable the client would in 
effect be forced to purchase the privilege of exercising what is 
his absolute right to settle his case in good faith. 
Furthermore, alternative contingent fee/hourly rate agreements 
place the lawyer in the position of choosing the method used to 
calculate his fee by either approving or disapproving the proposed 
settlement. This introduces an additional conflict not otherwise 
inherent in the contingent fet agreement. The lawyer would be 
unduly tempted, consciously or unconsciously, to refuse to approve 
a reasonable settlement offer to increase his fee where a change to 
the hourly rate would have that effect. This is so contrary to the 
fiduciary relationship between the lawyer and the client, that such 
agreements ought not be permitted for that reason alone. 
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V. 
There is no legal or factual basis for plaintiff's 
claim that he was fraudulently induced to 
enter the contingent fee agreement. 
Plaintiff expresses outrage at having been induced into 
entering into what he considered to be the equivalent of a 60% 
contingent fee agreement by what he claims is the trickery of the 
Homeowners. The Homeowners heartily dispute the claims that they 
tricked plaintiff or fraudulently misrepresented the value of their 
claims. Indeed, it is doubtful that they, even collectively, are 
that clever. But whatever plaintiff's claims may be, the 
undisputed facts show that plaintiff's claim that he was defrauded 
is disingenuous and there is no merit to his assertion that he is 
entitled to set the contract aside on grounds of fraud. 
A. Plaintiff's conduct over the last six years makes his 
assertion that the alleged misrepresentations were material to him 
so incredible that the assertion may be disregarded as a matter of 
law. 
After learning of the alleged misrepresentation in September 
1980, the plaintiff continued to represent the Homeowners through a 
trial and an appeal to the Utah Supreme Court, and was ready to 
represent them through another trial. R. 1583-1584, 1589-1590. In 
spite of his plaintiff's assertion that the alleged 
misrepresentations were significant to him and the outrage now 
expressed by him in his brief, he never mentioned the 
misrepresentation to John Webster, plaintiff's liaison with the 
Homeowners. R. 1589-1590, 1584-1585. Nor did he make any 
reference to the misrepresentation in his October 1980 letter to 
the Homeowners reporting on the results of the first trial 
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(R. 1589-1590); nor did he make any allegations of fraud in his 
September 1983 complaint or any of the seven amended complaints 
proposed in this action (R. 2, 264, 539, 553, 708, 834, 911, 1184); 
nor did he raise any claim of fraud in any of the first three 
hearings on the Homeowners1 motion for summary judgment on the fee 
issue, R. 1226, 1318, 1391. Absolutely no mention of the alleged 
fraud was made during the six years after plaintiff claims to have 
discovered it. R. 1584-1585. 
Given plaintiff's conduct, his claim that the alleged 
misrepresentations we e material to him is so unbelievable that it 
may, as a matter of law, be disregarded. A claim based on evidence 
too incredible to be accepted by reasonable minds does not raise an 
issue that would preclude the order of summary judgment in the 
Homeowners' favor. Gross v. Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland, 29 
F.Supp. 1005 (S.D. Ohio 1939). Similarly, a pretended issue, one 
upon which no substantial evidence can be offered in support, is 
not a genuine issue that will preclude a summary judgment. 
Southern Distributing Co., Inc. v. Southdown, Inc., 574 F.2d 824, 
826 (5th Cir. 1978). 
B. The only relevant alleged misrepresentation is a statement 
of opinion or judgment which will not support a fraud claim. 
Only those material misrepresentations alleged to have been 
relied upon by plaintiff prior to the time of the contingent fee 
agreement can be relevant here. Pace v. Parrish, 122 Ut. 141, 247 
P.2d 273 (1952). Plaintiff claims two misrepresentations regarding 
the value of the black substance claim. The first is that the cost 
of correcting the black substance problem would be "very 
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substantial." R. 1540. The second is that the cost of correcting 
the black substance problem would be $78,000. R. 1539. 
The only representation regarding the value of the black 
substance claim upon which plaintiff can say he relied prior to 
agreeing to the March 1980 contingent fee agreement is that "the 
expenses for repairing the 'black substance1 . . . would be very 
substantial."12 R. 1540. A representation that the cost of 
repairing the black substance problem would be "very substantial," 
is a statement of opinion or judgment. What is substantial to one 
person may not seem substantial to another. Specifically, what may 
be substantial to clients, especially retired folks on fixed 
incomes, may not be substantial to a lawyer used to dealing in very 
large sums. Even if the cost to repair the black substance problem 
were nine or ten thousand dollars as plaintiff claims, that is a 
"very substantial" sum. 
A representation that the cost of repair would be substantial 
cannot be the basis for an allegation of fraudulent inducement, 
since a claim of fraud cannot be based on the mere expression of an 
opinion or upon representations in regard to matters of estimate or 
judgment. Law v. Sidney, 47 Ariz. 1, 53 P.2d 64, 66 (1936). 
Before a fraud claim is actionable: 
The representation must relate to a past or present 
matter of fact, . . . and must not be put forward simply 
as an expression of opinion; and . . . [t]he 
12Plaintiff does not recall relying on the $78,000 figure at 
any time prior to the time the contingent fee agreement was entered 
in March 1980. R. 1540. A written estimate containing the $78,000 
figure was not received until August 1980. R. 1544. 
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circumstances must have been such as to justify the 
defrauded party in relying on the representation, as a 
basis of his own decision . . . . 
Adamson v. Brockbank, 112 Ut. 52f 75, 185 P.2d 264, 276 (1947) 
(quoting Black, Rescission of Contracts at paragraph 68, p. 172). 
There being no misrepresentation of fact in this case, there can be 
no fraud upon which plaintiff can base a claim to set aside the 
contingent fee agreement. 
C. Plaintiff is barred by the statute of limitations from 
seeking relief based upon fraud discovered six years ago. 
An action seeking relief based upon fraud must be commenced 
within three years after the fraud is discovered or the claim is 
barred by the statute of limitations. § 78-12-26(3), Utah Code 
Ann. An action is commenced by the filing of a complaint (Utah R. 
Civ. P. 3(a)) and allegations of fraud in a complaint must be 
stated with particularity. Utah R. Civ. P. 9(b). 
None of the plaintiff's five filed complaints or additional 
three proposed complaints allege with particularity or otherwise 
that he was fraudulently induced to enter the fee agreement. The 
allegation in plaintiff's complaints, as explained in the 
correspondence and elsewhere, relate solely to the Homeowners1 July 
1983 settlement of the litigation with the developers. R. 2, 264, 
539, 553, 708, 834, 911, 1184. Since six years have passed since 
the discovery of the alleged fraud without the filing of a 
complaint alleging fraud, the plaintiff is forever barred from 
asserting any claim for relief based upon having been fraudulently 
induced to enter the March 4, 1980 contingent fee agreement. 
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D. By continuing to represent the Homeowners for three years 
after discovering the alleged fraud, plaintiff has waived any 
alleged right to set aside the agreement. 
Where one has been fraudulently induced to enter a contract, 
and after discovering the fraud, continues to perform the contract, 
he is deemed to waive the claimed fraud. Bezner v. Continental Dry 
Cleaners, Inc., 548 P.2d 898, 901 (Utah 1976). 
If a person claims that a contract or conveyance was 
procured by fraud, he must elect to rescind promptly or 
he will be barred relief upon the ground of having 
ratified the transaction. If he proceeds to execute the 
contract with knowledge that fraud has been perpetrated 
on him, or continues to receive benefits under the 
contract after he has become aware of the fraud, or if he 
otherwise conducts himself with respect to it as though 
it were a subsisting and binding engagement, he will be 
deemed to have affirmed [the contract] and waived his 
right to rescind. 
Power v. Esarey, 37 Wash.2d 407, 224 P.2d 323, 326 (Wash. 1950) 
(quoting 9 Am.Jur. Cancelation of Instruments § 46 (1937). 
By continuing to represent the Homeowners in the prior 
litigation for nearly three years after discovery of the alleged 
fraud, by bringing an action against the Homeowners for breach of 
the contingent fee agreement he now wishes to set aside, and by 
failing to raise a claim of fraud for six years, plaintiff has 
waived any right to set aside the contingent fee agreement that he 
might otherwise assert. Indeed, by his conduct, plaintiff has 
unequivocally affirmed the contingent fee agreement and must abide 
by the provision providing for payment of a 30% contingent fee as 
set forth in this court's prior order. 
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VI. 
Mr. DeBry is not entitled to any interest 
on his claim for attorney1s fee. 
A. DeBryfs conduct makes the award of interest inappropriate. 
There are a number of familiar legal reasons why plaintiff 
should not be permitted to recover any interest on the contingent 
fee he refused to accept. While these will be discussed in due 
course, the foremost reason for denying the recovery of any 
interest is peculiar to this case and cases like these. Most 
simply put/ plaintiff's conduct makes the recovery of interest 
inappropriate. 
The rule that the plaintiff should not be permitted to gain by 
having unlawfully included a restriction on settlement is his fee 
agreement should be applied to preclude the recovery of interest on 
the contingent fee which was offered but which he refused to 
accept. Applying the rule to preclude the recovery of interest 
furthers the policy of discouraging the use of such provisions, and 
perhaps more importantly, discouraging the use of litigation to 
intimidate clients or to penalize them for their supposed breach of 
unenforceable restrictions on settlement. 
It is inappropriate to permit plaintiff to recover any 
interest in this case because there was no rational basis for 
plaintiff's refusal to approve the settlement and accept the 
contingent fee. As already discussed, plaintiff's contingent fee 
under the settlement was higher than any fee he could have received 
if the case were tried and was comparable or higher than any fee he 
could have received in the unlikely event that the case were 
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settled at the figure approved by him and rejected by the 
developers. 
Plaintiff's refusal to approve the settlement was never 
warranted nor was his suit for $31f300 in attorney's fees. There 
was no ethical or economic basis for Mr. DeBry's refusal to consent 
to the $61,000 settlement or for his disputing the fee owed. This 
litigation has cost his former clients thousands of dollars in 
attorney's fees and considerable anxiety. Consequently, plaintiff 
should not be permitted to recover interest on the contingent fee 
because to do so would reward him for conduct which should be 
discouraged among lawyers. 
B. DeBry's refusal to accept the contingent fee precludes 
recovery of any interest. 
At the time the prior suit with the developers was settled, 
Mr. Webster and other representatives of the Homeowners met with 
plaintiff to discuss his demand for money in addition to the agreed 
30% contingency fee. At that time, Mr. Webster, on behalf of the 
Homeowners, offered to pay plaintiff $18,300 (30% of the 
settlement) as provided by the fee agreement, plus any accrued 
costs. R. 1246-1247, 1636. Plaintiff refused to accept this sum, 
and sued for an additional $13,000. R. 1247, 1637. 
"'Prejudgment interest' represents an amount awarded as 
damages due to the opposing party's delay in tendering the amount 
owing . . . ." L & A Drywall, Inc. v. Whitmore Construction Co., 
Inc., 608 P.2d 626, 629 (Utah 1980). The rejection of an offer of 
payment stops the running of interest. Utah County v. Brown, 672 
P.2d 83, 87 at n. 9 (Utah 1983). Specifically, where, as here, an 
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attorney refuses to accept payment of his attorney's fee, he is not 
entitled to recover any interest for the time prior to the entry of 
judgment. Griffin v. McCarthy, 174 Wash. 74, 24 P.2d 595, 596 
(1933), appeal dismissed and cert, denied, 291 U.S. 653 (1934). 
As a matter of law the attorney's fee owed by the Homeowners 
was at most 30% of the $61,000 settlement. There being no basis in 
law or fact for plaintiff's refusal to approve the settlement offer 
or for insisting upon payment of the contingent fee plus an 
additional $13,000, plaintiff cannot claim the Homeowners 
insistence that he accept $18,300 as payment for his fees was not 
justified.1^ Even if the tender was conditioned on plaintiff not 
seeking any additional fees as plaintiff has claimed (R. 1394), it 
was a condition that the Homeowners had a right to insist upon, and 
so was not a condition that would make the offer to pay ineffective 
as a tender. Dull v. Dull, 138 Ariz. 357, 674 P.2d 911, 913 (Ct. 
App. 1983) ("[a] tender is not conditional if the condition is one 
which the person making the tender . . . has a legal right to 
insist upon11); accord, Plank v. Arban, 241 So.2d 198, 200 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1970); City of Newark v. Block 86, Lot 30, 94 N.J. 
Super. 468, 228 A.2d 877 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1967). 
Moreover, where it is plain, as it is here, that the actual tender 
of funds would be useless, the tender is not defective because 
funds were not actually tendered. Hansen v. Christensen, 545 P.2d 
1152, 1154 (Utah 1976), reversed on other grounds, 748 P.2d 1084, 
See pp. 23 to 32, supra. 
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1089 (1988). Even the plaintiff admits that the Homeowners have 
been willing to pay the plaintiff $18f300 from the outset of this 
litigation. R. 1412. 
C. A lawyer cannot charge interest unless the client has so 
agreed in advance. 
The lawyer has an ethical duty to "reach a clear agreement 
with his client as to the basis of the fee charges to be made" and 
"should explain fully to [the client] the reasons for the 
particular fee arrangement he proposes." EC 2-19f Rules of 
Professional Conduct of the Utah State Barr (1971) f superceded by 
Rules of Professional Conduct effective 1988.14 
Accordingly, it has been repeatedly held that a lawyer may not 
charge interest on a client's account unless it is agreed to in 
advance by the client. E.g.f Informal Opinion 82-21, Connecticut 
State Bar as reported in ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional 
Conduct, 801:2058; Opinion 82-1, Ohio State Bar, as reported in 
ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, 801:6827; 
Opinion 81-14, Arizona State Bar, as reported in the ABA/BNA 
Lawyers' Manual on Professional Conduct, 801:1307; Opinion 1980-53, 
California State Bar, as reported in ABA/BNA Lawyers' Manual on 
Professional Conduct, 801:1601. 
In Informal Decision C-741 (1964) the ABA Committee on Ethics 
and Professional responsibility declared it improper to include a 
14Though Utah revised its Rules of Professional Responsibility 
in 1988, the revised rules do not in any way reduce the ethical 
obligations of lawyers nor do they make changes that would cause 
one to conclude that the ethical considerations set forth in the 
1971 version are no longer relevant as guides to ethical behavior. 
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legend stating interest would be charged on past-due accounts on 
the bills sent to clients. The committee feared that "the claimed 
accrual of interest on fees upon which the clients have not agreed, 
either in advance or upon conclusion of the servicesf [would 
constitute] a bargaining weapon an attorney might use in reaching 
agreement as to the amount of the fees." (1 Informal Ethics 
Opinions 329 (1975)). The same rationale would preclude plaintiff 
from recovering interest in this case. Again, the public policies 
associated with attorney's fee agreements justifies treating them 
differently than other types of agreements. Estate of Bradley, 128 
Misc.2d 240, 490 N.Y.S.2d 105, 106 (N.Y. Sur. 1985). 
VII. 
Sanctions should be imposed on 
plaintiff to deter him from using 
the courts to discipline or harass clients. 
This court has the power to impose sanctions for frivolous 
appeals pursuant to Rule 33, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and 
pursuant to its inherent power to impose sanctions in the 
administration of justice. Moreover, "when there has been a 
deviation from proper professional standards there should be some 
appropriate penalty, not only for the effect upon the attorney, but 
for the salute ~y measure for the benefit of the Bar and the 
public." In re Hansen, 586 P.2d 413, 417 (Utah 1978). Appropriate 
sanctions include the return of the attorney's fee paid by the 
client. Id. 
Sanctions should be imposed upon plaintiff in this case on 
each of the foregoing bases since there was never any justification 
for his refusal to approve the Homeowners' settlement, his 
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subsequent suit or this appeal. Rather than reducing his fee as 
plaintiff claims, the settlement yielded almost double what he 
could have expected after a successful trial because the cost to 
plaintiff of trying the case was more than his fee could possibly 
have been increased through trial. In light of the way plaintiff 
has multiplied the proceedings below and has used the system (and 
his ability to use the system at lower cost than the Homeowners) to 
punish the Homeowners for a supposed breach of an unenforceable 
restriction on settlement, a stiff sanction is warranted. If no 
sanction is imposed, plaintiff will in a sense have won. He will 
be able to hold the result in this case out as a lesson to other 
clients that seek to settle without his consent. The prudent 
client will in the future give plaintiff the fee demanded and save 
himself the anxiety and cost of enforcing his right to settle. 
Sanctions must be imposed so that the result in this case will be a 
lesson to lawyers, not a warning to clients. 
It would be appropriate in this case to require plaintiff to 
pay the costs of this appeal, including the Homeowners' attorney 
fees and to pay back all or at least a substantial portion of the 
attorney's fee which the Homeowners have paid to him. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, the Homeowners request that 
plaintiff's appeal be dismissed, that the court impose appropriate 
sanctions on plaintiff for filing a meritless appeal, including an 
award to the Homeowners of attorney's fees, double costs, and a 
refund of the attorney's fees paid plaintiff, and that the trial 
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court's award of interest to plaintiff on his attorney's fee be 
overruled. 
Respectfully submitted this 21st day of November, 1988. 
CHAPMAN AND CUTLER 
/A&r*M& /\j/^/&t*sU<#: 
L.R. GARDINER, JR. 
THOMAS R. VUKSINICK 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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November 9, 1978 
Mr. Ashby Badger, President 
Graystone Pines Owner's Ass'n. 
2710 Highland Drive, #4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Mr. William Keyser 
2710 Highland Drive, #10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84117 
Gentlemen: 
This will confirm our arrangement that I will 
immediately commence preliminary research and a drafting of 
the complaint and interrogatories in the Graystone Pines 
matter. In accordance with our understanding, I will charge 
$50.00 per hour. 
I am attaching herewith my initial bill of $400 
for the work done to date. I understand that you will bring 
in an initial retainer of $2500 in the near future. That 
money will be deposited in our trust account. Thereafter, 
you will receive periodic billings, and with each billing we 
will automatically withdraw the appropriate amount. 
We apparently agree that the strategy will be to 
press defendants to enter into a favorable arbitration agree-
ment. We can best accomplish that objective by hitting them 
hard with a good, solid complaint and extensive interrogatories. 
Thus, your first few billings will be relatively high. 
I am attaching a copy of the letter to the defendants, 
We are not waiting for their answer. Instead, we are pushing 
ahead with our research and drafting of pleadings. 
Sincerely yours. 
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March 4, 1980 
Mr. Ashby Badger 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr- Bill Kaiser 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
iMr. John Webster 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Gentlemen 
Re: Graystone Pines 
I appreciated the candid discussion we had about the cost of 
the present litigation. 
It is true that I initially underestimated the cost of the 
litigation. For that, I apologize. However, it is extremely 
difficutl to predict, in advance, the cost of litigation. Primarily, 
that is because we cannot know in advance how obstreperous the 
defense will be. 
Also, in reviewing the file, it appears that I made that 
estimate before I was aware that the corporation had been bankrupted 
by Busch, Coulam and Jensen. Our effort to "pierce the corporate 
veil" really doubles the expense and complexity of this litigation. 
In a sense, that is water under the bridge. However, I think 
it is fair for us all to take a lesson from that. I have estimated 
that we are about7 one-half way through the expenses of this case. 
If everything goes our way, the actual cost could be substantially 
less. However, we may well buck up against unforeseen problems which 
would increase that cost. I would like to give you a more trustworthy 
figure, but I cannot; and I doubt if any other attorney can. 
A#\4 nf\^ 
Page Two 
March 4, 1980 
I have considered* your request that I continue the case on 
some sort of contingent fee. As I advised in the beginning, this 
is not the type of case which lends itself easily to a contingent fee. 
In part, that is because our original goal was simply to force the 
defendants into arbitration. 
Contingent fees generally run from 30-60% depending upon the 
complexity of the case and other factors. The typical contingent 
fee would be 33 1/3%; however, it is by no means uncommon to see 
40-50-60% contingent fees. 
I believe that few attorneys would tackle this case on a 
contingent fee. If they did so, I would suspect that a reasonable 
contingent fee for this type of case would be 60% of any recovery. 
Of course, we are about one-half way through the litigatioji process. 
Thus, a reasonable contingent fee to press the case from this point 
on would be 30% of any recovery. If you wish, I would finish the 
case on that basis (i.e., 30% of any recovery). You would, of course, 
have the obligation to pay "out of pocket" expenses such as telephone, 
photocopies, witness fees, depositions, research fees, experts, etc. 
However, before you settle on a contingent fee, remember that it is 
a gamble. If we go through another 100-200 hours and lose the case, 
you obviously win the gamble. However, we might just as well enter 
into some settlement next week in which case you lose the gamble. 
One further matter on contingent fees. Clients are sometimes 
overly optimistic because they are not paying anything to their 
attorney. Thus, they may turn down reasonable settlement offers 
because it costs them nothing to gamble on the results of a trial. 
Therefore, I would accept the contingent fee only if I had complete 
and unfettered control over any settlement. 
If the contingent fee proposed is for any reason unworkable, 
I would continue to work on an hourly basis. However, I would like 
to point out one thing. When I accepted the case, I told you that 
my regular fee for litigation was $70 per hour. However, I agreed 
to take on the case for $50 per hour. Since that time I have" in-
creased my regular fee for litigation to $90 per hour. I have not 
raised my fee for this case—nor do I intend to do so. However, I 
certainly cannot ^ reduce my fee in any way. 
There is one alternative which you should realistically consider. 
You might find another attorney who could handle this matter for less 
money. I would harbor no bad feelings about such an arrangement, and 
I would cooperate with your new counsel in every way. Although few 
lawyers will admit it, hiring a lawyer is much like hiring a gardner. 
The client should shop around and find someone who will do an adequate 
job at the lowest price. 
«.«i.-AShby Badger 
Mr.'Bill Kaiser 
Mr- John Webster 
Page Three 
March 4, 1930 
There is one final way in which you might hold the price down. 
As far as possible, you can provide manpower to assist with the 
necessary legwork. (I might add that you have been splendid about 
these requests so far.) Whatever work you can do saves $50 per hour. 
At the moment, I have one request pending. I have asked Bill 
Kaiser to get two blown-up photos of the microscopic study compairing 
Rockwool insulation and the "black substance". 
I can now add further requests. I am attaching a written report 
from Clawson which outlines what must be done (in his opinion) to 
repair the roof. I would like you to get about five written bids 
from reputable roofers (including Clawson) on the cost of the repairs 
he has recommended. With each bid, get a written guarante.e (e.g., 
one year or ten years, etc.). Also, ask the roofer to bid on any 
extra or alternate system which the builder might suggest to improve 
Clawson1s plan. Have the roofer give a written guarantee on the 
alternative. 
Finally, I am going to need a scale model of the roof for the 
trial. The model should measure about 41 X 8' and be portable enough 
to carry into court. The model should be constructed in such detail 
that our expert can point out where the leaks occur and why. Also, 
the expert must show, on the model, why a whole new roof was necessary 
to correct the problem. Perhaps the model could be constructed in 
such a way that we could actually tear it down and show how the new 
roof looks. We can also construct full-size models of any particular 
part of the roof (e.g. corners, flashing, etc.) which contribute 
to the problem. 
Such models might cost $1,000 or so. However, that would be 
the most important part of the trial. The jury should see why the 
leaks occur. You could work with our expert to construct such models. 
Such models are generally admissible in evidence so long as they 
fairly and accurately depict the real roof. Thus, they should, so 
far as possible, be scale models down to and including the same 
materials. 




Robert J. DeBry 




Mr. Ashby Badger 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. Bill Kaiser 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Mr. John Webster 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Sentlemen: 
SOI 202-©013 




I would like to review the events of last week. 
John came by to ask my advice about making a 561,000 
rounter offer. I vigorously recommended against that plan. 
John apparently met with the group and received their authority 
Lo go ahead againsf my advice. John then delivered the counter 
>ffer without my knowledge or consent. I was informed after the 
fact. 
I have informed you that your conduct leaves me in an 
lwkward position. I believe I would be perfectly justified in 
withdrawing, and I told you that I would give my answer after the 
weekend. 
After due consideration I think the time before the 
:rial is too short to accommodate a smooth transfer to a new 
.awyer. Therefore, I will not withdraw from your case. The 
\atter will be tried by my associate, Robert Hansen. 
However, I must emphasize that you oust assume full 
•esponsibility for going against my advice and assuming direct 
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June 24, 1983 
Mr. John Webster 
2170 Highland Drive 
Apartment No. 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. Ashby Badger 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment No. 4 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Mr. Bil Kaiser 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment No. 10 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Gentlemen: 
I have asked Mr. Roth and Mr. Wheeler to prepare the 
settlement documents and forward them to me with a check. I 
will notify you when those documents arrive. 
In my letter of March 4, 1980, I reluctantly agreed to 
your proposal of a contingent fee. However, a clear condition 
of that agreement was that I would control the settlement 
negotiations. Since you have now breached that condition, it is 
my opinion that we must revert back to the hourly fee. 
I think that is especially appropriate in view of the 
reason for your settlement. In our last discussion, it was very 
clear that you were settling on the reduced basis because some 
or all of the parties did not wish to go through the stress of a 
trial. In fact, I heard the comment that someone would rather 
pay $1,000.00 out of his own pocket, than go through another 
trial. I am certainly sympathetic with those feelings. 
However, it is not appropriate to have my contingent fee reduced 





June 24, 1983 
For the foregoing reasons, I am submitting my bill 
based upon an hourly basis. If you do not agree, you should 
contact an outside attorney to ccnsult with you in this matter. 
Sio£e^ely, 





May 2, 1983 
JOHN WEBSTER 
2710 Highland Drive, #12 
Salt Lake City 
Utah, 84106 
Dear John: 
Re: Graystone Pines 
As you know, the earliest trial date we could get 
was July 5, 1983, That leaves me in a dilemma. On the one 
hand, I have a family vacation scheduled for most of the mont.* 
of July. On the other hand, I think your interest is best 
served by getting an early trial. 
We might solve that problem by inviting outside 
counsel to try the case. That is a fairly common practice, 
and I could assist in the preparation. That is also a fairly 
common practice. 
approve this arrangement. 
the matter ^ ith Robert Hansen 
He is receptive to the idt±zn He 
Therefore, I recommend that you 
The arrangement would cost you no more because I 
would pay Mr. Hansen out of my contingent fee. I would plan 
to pay him a fee_oL 20%, (you pay me 30%) . In fact, this 
is a mfljor^f-h^n^Tl sacrifice on mv paff as it vnnlri Ipavfi me 
with perhaps $10#000 for 3 years of work. Nevertheless, I see 
no other way to resolve the problem. If you agree, please 
sign below. 
Sincerely, 
DATED this 'day of May, 1983. 
t_^john Webster 
R. 1016 - 1021 
Randall S. Feil 1052 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 3341 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
American Plaza II 
P.O. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
and Counter-Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, : 
Plaintiff, : AFFIDAVIT OF 
: JOHN WEBSTER 
vs. : 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS : Civil No. C83-5167 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH; : 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN : Judge Raymond S. Uno 
JENSEN; and the partnership : 




JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON, : 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS : 
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE : 
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS : 
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES : 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on : 
behalf of the owners of all : 
the units in the Graystone : 
Pines Condominiums, : 
Intervenors and 
Counter-Plaintiffs. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John Webster, after having been first duly sworn, 
deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am a member of the Graystone Pines 
Homeowners Association and am named as a defendant in the 
above-entitled action. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the events 
relative to the prior lawsuit, Civil No. C79-763, ("prior 
lawsuit") brought by the Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association on behalf of the Homeowners against Graystone 
Pines, Inc., and defendants Busch, Coulam and Jensen 
("developers"). At the time the prior lawsuit was tried and 
through the time that suit was settled, and until April 11, 
1985, I was president of Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association. 
3. On or about November 9, 1978, the Association 
hired the plaintiff, attorney Robert J. DeBry (hereinafter 
"DeBry") to represent the Association in the prior lawsuit 
the builders and developers of Graystone Pines Condominiums 
(hereinafter "developers"). The Complaint in the prior 
lawsuit was filed in 1979. 
4. DeBry was paid at an hourly rate of $50.00 
per hour for the time spent in prosecuting the prior 
-2-
lawsuit. Between November 9, 1978, and March 4; 1980, the 
Homeowners paid DeBry at least $15,354.42 (exclusive of 
costs) for work performed on the homeowners' case. 
5. In March of 1980 a new compensation plan was 
proposed by DeBry, whereby DeBry would receive 30% of any 
recovery achieved in our case; this amount to be in addition 
to the fees the Association had already paid. The 
Association agreed to DeBry's terms on March 27, 1980. 
6. The first trial in the prior lawsuit was 
begun on September 16, 1980 and continued for eleven days to 
October lf 1980. At the end of the trial, the trial court 
dismissed all of the Homeowners1 claims except their claim 
for damage to the condominiums caused by a black substance 
(the "black substance" claim") which formed where the walls 
met the floor in many areas of the three buildings 
comprising Graystone Pines Condominiums. Mr. DeBry, without 
first consulting with me or any member of the Homeowner's 
Association and without my or the Homeowner's Association's 
consent, then stipulated to dismissal of the black substance 
claim with prejudice. The Homeowners Association appealed 
the dismissal of all of the claims including the black 
substance claim. On July 20, 1982, Utah Supreme Court 
remanded for trial all of the dismissed claims, except the 
black substance claim which it refused to reinstate. The 
reinstated claims were set for trial in about mid-July, 
1983-
7. Some months before the second trial was to 
begin Mr. DeBry requested that I enter direct negotiations 
with the developers to see if a satisfactory settlement 
might be made. DeBry told me that he believed that I was 
better qualified to handle the negotiations than he. I kept 
Mr. DeBry advised of the progress of the settlement 
negotiations and he was made aware of each settlement offer 
before it was made. Mr. DeBry advised me on several 
occasions that Gra ystone Homeowners Association was free to 
accept any settlement offer with which it was comfortable. 
8. Prior to the second trial, Mr. DeBry and I 
had a discussion regarding a likely recovery in the event it 
was necessary to have a second trial. He told me that there 
was a 75% chance of recovering between $50,000 and $80f000, 
50% chance of recovering between $80,000 and $100,000, a 25% 
chance of recovering between $100,000 and $300,000 if 
punitive damages were allowed. At the time we had the 
discussion, the court had already dismissed the Homeowners 
claim for punitive damages upon motion by the defendant 
developers in the prior lawsuit. 
9. During my negotiations with Mr. Busch, Mr. 
DeBry recommended that I extend an offer to Busch to settle 
-
the case for payment to the homeowners of $75,000. With Mr. 
DeBry's consent, I made that offer to Mr. Busch, and the 
offer was rejected. 
10. At no time during the settlement negotiations 
did I request that only Graystone Homeowners Association's 
name appear as a payee on the settlement check, that Mr. 
DeBry's name should be omitted as a payee on the settlement 
check or that the check be delivered directly to Graystone 
rather than to DeBry. 
^^XJohn Webster 
SUBSCRIBED, SWORN, and EXECUTED before me this 
y * 
£- day of Scji<^\j*
 w , A.D., 1985. 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
Residing: ^k'.,s^ ,~l-^ < i^-w^ 
My Commission Expires: ' &~ 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER, 
postage prepaid, this day of , 
1985, to the following: 
Stephen Roth, Esq. 
Bruce R. Garner, Esq. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
-6- *0 n> 
R. 1245 - 1248 
t fcr.'t ft £. ~ r- I 
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Randall S. Feil 1052 
Thomas R. Vuksinick 3341 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
57 West 200 South, Suite 400 
American Plaza II 
P.O. Box 3450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
and Counter-Plaintiffs 
ArR N 4 i s PH '86 
.".h 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN 
JENSEN; the partnership 
Of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER 
and Commercial Security Bank 
Defendants, 
vs. 
JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS 
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE 
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS 
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on 
behalf of the owners of all 




AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER 
Civil No. C83-5167 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
^isAlA^ 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
:ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
John Webster, having been first duly sworn, deposes and 
says as follows: 
1. I am a member of the Graystone Pines Homeowners' 
Association and am named as a defendant in the above-
entitled action. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the events relating to 
the prior lawsuit, Civil No. C79-763, ("prior lawsuit") 
brought by the Graystone Pines Homeowners' Association on 
behalf of the homeowners against Graystone Pines, Inc., and 
Defendants Busch, Coulam and Jensen, ("Developers"). At the 
time the prior lawsuit was tried and through the time that 
the suit was settled, and until April 11, 1985, I was 
president of Graystone Pines Homeowners' Association. 
3. On June 29, 1983, Florence Lewon, Roy Meilson, 
Dorothy Croft (all members of the Homeowners' Association), 
and I met with Robert DeBry in his office in an effort to 
resolve the issues that had arisen with respect to the 
settlement of the prior lawsuit with the developers and Mr. 
DeBry's claim for additional attorney's fees. 
4. Mr« DeBry was reluctant to discuss his attorney's 
fee at the meeting; however, on behalf of the homeowners, I 
offered to pay Mr. DeBry 30 percent of the $61,000 





















he had incurred for which he had not been reimbursed. Mr. 
DeBry refused to accept the $18,300 plus costs and demanded 
that he be paid a total of $31,300 plus $1,021.35 in costs. 
5. After Mr. DeBry's refusal to accept $18,300 as his 
attorney's fee, he commenced this action in August, 1983, 
seeking recovery of an attorney's fee in the sum of $31,300. 
DATED this ^ day of April, 1986. 
4^^/ John Webster 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this J/j^L-^day of 
April, 1986. 
e s : 
otary Public 
Residing a t r 
•'JA A6MLLd_^ 
Residing a u ^ 
26 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER, postage 
prepaid, this llfP\ day of April, 1986, to the following: 
Stephen Roth, Esq. 
Bruce R. Garner, Esq* 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & "MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, 11th Floor 
P.O. Box 3000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
H. Wayne Wadsworth, Esq. 
WATKISS & CAMPBELL 
310 South Main, 12th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Robert J. DeBry, Esq. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
4252 South 700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 
M. David Eckersley, Esq. 
HOUPT, ECKERSLEY & DOWNES 
419 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
wUd- ± 
R. 1589 - 1590 
not e?«4 
October 9# 1980 
John Webster 
2710 Highland Drive 
Apartment 12 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106 
Dear John: 
I would like to give you a report on the trial which 
was recently concluded against Graystone Pines, Inc. 
A trial really takes place in two separate stages. 
The first stage of the trial deals with legal issues. The second 
stage of the trial deals with factual issues. 
At the close of all evidence, both parties make a series 
of motions which deal with the legal aspects of the trial. For the 
most part, those are all technical matters. After the judge has 
ruled on those technical/legal matters, he can present the remaining 
factual irsues to the jury. 
In this trial, the defendant made a number of legal 
motions after the evidence was submitted. I do not recall the exact 
count; however, there were 10-15 separate motions argued. The judge 
ruled in favor of the defendant on most of those motions. The result 
was that the judge dismissed most of our case for technical/legal 
reasons. In other words, he ruled that we lost the case on legal 
technicalities; and there was no reason for the jury to make any 
rulings on the facts. 
Our next step is to appeal this judge's decision to 
the Utah Supreme Court. I will pursue that matter vigorously. I 
am confident that the Supreme Court will reverse Judge Taylor. If 
the case is reversed, we will then go back and have a new trial. 
The only difference will be that in the second trial, the various 
legal technicalities will have been decided by the Supreme Court. 
Thus, our second trial would really be to prove our case to the jury. 
It is difficult to explain the judge's numerous rulings 
because they were of such a technical nature. However, I will give 
you one example. Approximately 1 1/2-2 years after everyone moved 
in, a meeting was held with Mr. Busch. During that meeting, part 
EXHIBIT 5 
CLUTIKIIiD AS A SPECIALIST IN CIVIL TNIAI. ADVOCACY 
BY THE NATIONAL IIOAHP O f TRIAL ADVOCACY 001589 
Mr. John Webster 
Page Two 
October 9, 1980 
of the conversation was to the effect that the homeowners demanded 
that the roof be repaired according to specifications and suggestions 
provided by Mr. Harwood. The judge ruled that such a conversation 
is, in fact, a refusal to permit the developers to make repairs. 
The judge ruled that if someone has a guaranty or warranty, he is 
obligated to permit the contractor to make the repairs whenever and 
however the contractor wants. According to the judge, a demand to 
repair the roof in a certain way therefore nullifies the guaranty. 
Since the judge ruled that the guaranty was nullified, there was 
no issue to present to the jury. 
Of course, we think the judge's ruling was incorrect; 
and as stated above, we will appeal that ruling. However, that is 
a sample of the type of technical rulings which a judge can make 
as a basis for dismissing a case. 
There was only one very small matter which the judge 
did not dismiss. I believe that to be only about 10% of our case. 
The judge ruled that the jury could decide whether or not the black 
material on the carpet was coming from the attic and whether that 
violated any implied warranty. It was my judgment that there would 
be great danger in splitting up our case and submitting only 10? 
of our case to the jury. Therefore, I agreed to dismiss that claim 
so that we could keep the rest of the case together and appeal it 
all together. There was some danger in dismissing that claim because 
we may not be able to reinstate that claim at a later time. However, 
I felt strongly that it would not be wise to submit that one isolated 
issue to the jury. On the other hand, it is probable that we can 
reinstate this claim at least under our theory of express warranty 
if the Supreme Court rules in our favor. 
Sincerely, 
RJD:sg 
Robert J. DcBry 
R. 1631 - 1638 
L. R. Gardiner, Jr. A1148 
Thomas R. Vuksinick A3341 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
American Plaza II, Suite 400 
57 West 200 South 
Post Office Box 45450 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-7751 
Attorneys for Intervenors 
and Counter-Plaintiffs 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ROBERT J. DEBRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GRAYSTONE PINES HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION; ROBERT BUSCH; 
RONALD COULAM; MELVIN 
JENSEN; the partnership 
of SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & 
MARTINEAU, JOHN WEBSTER; 




JOHN WEBSTER, ROY NEILSON, 
FLORENCE LEWON, CARLOS 
CROFT and LOUISE MALLONEE 
as the BOARD OF MANAGERS 
OF THE GRAYSTONE PINES 
HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION on 
behalf of the owners of all 
the units in the Graystone 
Pines Condominiums, 
AFFIDAVIT OF JOHN WEBSTER 
Civil No. C83-5167 
Judge Raymond S. Uno 
Intervenors and 
Counter-Plaintiffs. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Having been first duly sworn, deposes and says as 
follows: 
1. I am a member of the Graystone Pines Homeowners 
Association. 
2. I have personal knowledge of the events relating to 
the prior law suit, Civil No. C79-763f ("Prior Lawsuit") 
brought by the Graystone Pines Homeowners Association on 
behalf of the Homeowners against Graystone Pines, Inc., and 
the developers Busch, Coulam and Jensen ("Developers"). At 
the time the Prior Lawsuit was tried and through the time 
that suit was settled, and until April 11, 1985, I was 
president of Graystone Pines Homeowners Association. 
3. On or about November 9, 1978, the Homeowners hired 
plaintiff, attorney Robert J. DeBry, to represent the 
Homeowners Association in the Prior Lawsuit against the 
developers who built the Graystone Pines condominiums. The 
complaint in the Prior Lawsuit was filed in 1979. 
4. DeBry was paid at an hourly rate of $50 per hour 
for the time spent in prosecuting the Prior Lawsuit. 
5. The attorney's fees and expenses incurred in 
litigating the Homeowners1 claims against the Developers were 
more than plaintiff had estimated at the outset. This 
increase in expenses greatly concerned the Homeowners, who 
were for the most part retired people on fixed incomes, 
particularly since it appeared that the Homeowners1 claims 
against the Developers were far from resolution. Discussions 
were had with plaintiff concerning the future cost of 
litigation and possible changes in the initial fee agreement. 
6. In March 1980, a new compensation plan was proposed 
by plaintiff whereby plaintiff would receive 30% of any 
recovery achieved in the Prior Lawsuit in addition to the 
fees that had already been paid to plaintiff by the 
Homeowners. The Homeowners agreed to the change to the 
contingent fee agreement on March 27, 1980. 
7. The first trial on the Prior Lawsuit was begun on 
September 16, 1980 and continued for eleven trial days to 
October lf 1980. At the end of the trial, the court 
dismissed all of the Homeowners claims except their claim for 
damage to the condominiums caused by a black substance (the 
"black substance" claim) which formed where the walls met the 
floor in many areas of the three buildings comprising 
Graystone Pines condominiums. Plaintiff, without first 
consulting with me or any member of the Homeowners 
Association and without my or the Homeowners Association's 
consent, then stipulated to dismissal of the black substance 
claim with prejudice. 
8. Thereafter, plaintiff on the Homeowners1 behalff 
appealed the dismissal of all the claims including the black 
substance claim. On July 20, 1982, the Utah Supreme Court 
remanded for trial all of the dismissed claims except the 
black substance claim which it refused to reinstate. The 
reinstated claims were set for trial in about mid-July 1983. 
9. Prior to the second trial, plaintiff and I had a 
discussion regarding the likelihood of recovery in the event 
it was necessary to have a second trial. He told me there 
was a 75% chance of recovering from between $50,000 and 
$80,000, a 50% chance of recovering between $80,000 and 
$100,000, and a 25% of recovering between $100,000 and 
$300,000 if punitive damages were allowed. At the time we 
had the discussion, the court had already dismissed the 
Homeowners claim for punitive damages upon motion by the 
defendant Developers in the Prior Lawsuit. 
10. Some months before the second trial was to begin, 
plaintiff requested that I enter direct negotiations with the 
Developers to see if a satisfactory settlement might be made. 
Plaintiff told me that he believed that I was better 
qualified to handle the negotiations than he. I kept 
plaintiff advised of the progress of the settlement 
negotiations and he was made aware of each settlement offer 
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before it was made. Mr. DeBry advised me on several 
occasions that the Homeowners were free to accept any 
settlement offer with which they were comfortable. 
11. I kept plaintiff advised of each step in the 
settlement negotiations with the Developers. In March 1983, 
the Homeowners suggested to the Developers that the prior 
litigation be settled for $98,470. In May 1983, the 
Developers responded that they were willing to pay only 
$30f000 to settle the case. The Homeowners, with plaintiff's 
consent, countered with an offer to settle for $75,000. In 
early June 1983 about five weeks before the second trial, the 
Developers responded by rejecting the $75,000 and offering to 
pay $47,000 to settle. The highest settlement offer the 
Developers had made prior to completion of the first trial in 
the Prior Lawsuit had been $45,000. 
12. Further negotiations were had with the Developers. 
In mid-June 1983 the Developers agreed to settle the Prior 
Lawsuit by paying the Homeowners $61,000. The plaintiff 
refused to approve settlement of the Prior Lawsuit for 
$61,000. He also refused to accept the contingent fee of 30% 
of the recovery as provided in his March 4, 1980 letter as 
his fee. Instead, he advised me that if the Prior Lawsuit 
were settled for $61,000, he would demand a fee of $31,300 
which he said he had calculated based on an hourly rate of 
$50 per hour and his "reconstruction" of the number of hours 
he had worked. 
13. On June 29, 1983f Florence Lewon, Roy Neilsonf 
Dorothy Croft (all members of the Homeowners Association) and 
I met with plaintiff in his office in an effort to resolve 
the issues that had arisen with respect to the settlement of 
the Prior Lawsuit and Mr. DeBry's claim for additional 
attorney's fees. Plaintiff was reluctant to discuss his 
attorney's fee at that meeting; howeverf on behalf of the 
Homeowners, I offered to pay plaintiff 30% of the $61f000 
settlement ($18,300) plus any costs and miscellaneous expense 
he had incurred for which he had not been reimbursed. Mr. 
DeBry refused to accept the $18,300 plus costs and demanded 
that he be paid a total of $31,300 plus costs. At that 
meeting plaintiff told us that he would not go along with the 
settlement because he felt he could get more if the case were 
tried and that he could not as a matter of "professional 
pride" approve a settlement for $61,000. 
14. Plaintiff was going on vacation during the month 
of July, and so, was not available to appear at the second 
trial of the Prior Lawsuit in mid-July 1983. Plaintiff had, 
however, made arrangements with another attorney to appear at 
the second trial on behalf of the Homeowners. As 
compensation for his appearance, the other attorney was to 
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receive 2/3 of plaintiff's 30% contingent fee if the case 
were tried. As I understood it, the other attorney's portion 
of the contingent fee was to increase as the trial date 
approached. If the Prior Lawsuit were settled before July 1, 
1983, the other attorney would receive 5% of the recovery. 
If it were settled after July 1, 1983 but before trial, he 
would receive 10% of the recovery. If the Prior Lawsuit were 
settled after trial had begun, the other attorney was to 
receive a full 20% of any recovery. 
15. Plaintiff worked with the Homeowners from 1979 
through 1983 when the Prior Lawsuit was settled. During that 
time he was both advised and aware of the Homeowners1 desire 
to avoid both the expense and stress of the litigation 
process to the extent reasonably possible. He also knew that 
the Homeowners were generally comprised of older, retired 
people whose fixed incomes made it difficult for them to pay 
the costs of litigation. 
16. Immediately following the conclusion of the 
settlement, plaintiff filed a complaint against the 
Homeowners Association seeking recovery of $31,300 plus 
$1,021.35 in costs. 
DATED this &&//( day of December, 1986 • 
1
 S John Webster 
On the J ? ^ day of /fiU:-/^ , / 198^, personally 
appeared before me John Webster, the signer of the foregoing 
Affidavit of John Webster, who duly acknowledged to me that 
he executed the same. 
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